Address by H.E. Paul Kelly, Australian Ambassador to Lao PDR
“Australia’s Approach to Foreign Policy and the Bilateral Relationship with Lao PDR”
National Academy of Politics and Public Administration
Ban Tha-Ngorn, Vientiane Province, Lao PDR
15 December 2023
[BEGINS]
Thank you, Dr Daosavan Khuamixay, Vice President of the National Academy of Politics and Public Administration, for your welcome today.
And thank you DDG Sonthaya for your kind introduction.
It’s a great privilege to be at NAPPA today in beautiful Ban ThaNgorn – my first time here.
I can understand why Party Leaders chose this picturesque location as the new home of NAPPA when it moved from Viengxay in 1995.
This campus reminds me of my own university – the Australian National University located on Ngunnawal country in Canberra.
Similar to ThaNgorn, it is set upon a large campus surrounded by local flora and fauna.
The Ngunnawal people are the traditional custodians of Canberra and have maintained a cultural, spiritual and historical to the area for tens of thousands of years.
They form part of the wider community of Indigenous Australians who have the oldest continuing culture on earth, which dates back some 60,000 years.
I’d like to acknowledge the political and cultural significance of this important institution: NAPPA which for nearly 30 years has been responsible for promulgating the Party’s guiding political theories, such as Kaysone Phomvihane Thought, as well as drafting and disseminating successive Party Resolutions.
NAPPA also has the responsibility of making sure the next generation of Party members have the advanced skills required to guide Laos through its socio-economic development and navigate its place in the world.
* * *
In fact, I’d like to touch on some of these topics in my address today – my final speech to a Lao audience as Australia’s Ambassador.
Specifically, I’d like to reflect on the state of the bilateral relationship and touch on the ways our cooperation has grown over the past few years – and how it will continue to expand in 2024, especially in the context of Laos’ ASEAN Chair Year.
But no foreign policy speech would be complete without touching on some of the major challenges facing the world and the region.
I’d like to explain Australia’s approach to these emerging dynamics and outline the way we’re tackling these challenges with our friends and partners.
Foundations of the Laos-Australia relationship
At the outset, I think it’s important to say a few words about the bilateral relationship.
When I arrived at Post in early 2021, it was immediately clear to me the relationship was in good shape.
I could see that our people-to-people connections were long and strong, fostered by an active alumni network that traces its roots back to 1954 when the first Lao scholars went to Australia under the Colombo Plan.
Today, there are thousands of Australian alumni who have studied or undertaken professional development in Australia.
Many have returned to Laos to make significant contributions as government, business, and civil society leaders, enhancing Laos’ development and fostering greater understanding between our countries.
During those early interactions, I noticed Lao people seemed to share the same friendly and easy-going nature as Australians.
I remember learning the Lao expression “Bor Pen Nyang” and thinking how it captured a relaxed approach to life that Australians sometime express in the phrase “No worries, mate.”
But as time has passed, I’ve come to appreciate more similarities between Laos and Australia.
I think we are deeply pragmatic at heart – we seem to share a desire to solve problems and work for solutions that all parties can accept.
I also think Lao and Australians have a strong sense of determination and a commitment to unity and solidarity.
I saw this when I visited the Viengxay caves and learned about Laos’ revolutionary struggle.
And I’ve noticed the way Laos’ celebrates and includes all its many ethnic groups into its culture and society.
Similarly, Australia cherishes our diversity and multiculturalism.
Of the 25 million Australians, nearly half of us were born overseas or have a parent born overseas.
We see richness in diversity and strength in unity, which I believe permeates into the wider bilateral relationship.
I think these foundations mean that both Lao and Australian people are very open and lends itself to our friendly people-to-people ties.
* * *
Our government-to-government ties are also strong and growing, although I find many Lao and Australians surprised by the depth and breadth of the relationship.
I can understand why.
Our relationship isn’t built on shared democratic values, or culture, heritage, or language.
We don’t share similar political systems. Nor do we have the same Party to Party connections such as those Laos enjoys with Vietnam, China, or Cuba.
And yet the bilateral relationship is warm and constructive.
For me, this is because – at its heart – our bilateral relationship is based upon trust, understanding, and mutual respect.
We seek to be a trusted interlocutor of Laos with whom we have meaningful dialogue.
Let me give you an example in regard to our bilateral human rights dialogue.
Every two years, officials from our Ministries of Foreign Affairs / Justice / Public Security / Home Affairs / Planning and Investment, as well as the Lao Women’s Union and National Front for Development come together to discuss sensitive topics about political and civil rights, cases of concern, and other human rights obligations enshrined in international treaty law.
We do not prosecute our human rights positions or bilateral irritants by shouting at each other or wagging fingers.
Instead, we raise our points respectfully and discuss different approaches and solutions.
We strive to listen. To understand. To be open to different ideas and perspectives.
And when we disagree, we do so respectfully and privately.
Put another way: we keep at the table and keep talking on the shared belief that – through dialogue – we can always find a way through any difficulty or impasse.
Principles and vision for the region: trust and mutual respect
If trust and mutual respect are the foundations of our bilateral engagement, I would like to unpack how these principles are expressed in our respective foreign and strategic policies.
This matters because the shape and nature of any bilateral relationship reflects a set of principles – a certain ‘world view’ if you like – that informs any government’s foreign policy.
As my foreign minister, Penny Wong, puts it:
“Australia’s foreign policy must be an accurate and authentic reflection of a nation’s values and interests – of who we are and what we want.”
We want a region that operates by rules, standards and norms – where larger countries do not determine the fates of smaller countries; where every nation can make its own choices, pursue its own aspirations, and seek its own prosperity.
Australia is invested, engaged and committed to the region at the highest levels.
For instance, Foreign Minister Wong visited every ASEAN member, except Myanmar, in the first twelve months in office.
She made her first visit to Laos in May 2023…
…where she discussed with Prime Minister Sonexay, Deputy Prime Minister Saleumxay, and His Excellency Thongsavanh the ways Australia and our ASEAN partners can work to enhance our collective security and prosperity.
This level of engagement is a clear statement of Australia’s intent and priorities in the region.
We are listening to and understanding the views of our friends in the region.
And what she heard was that our Southeast Asian partners want growth, opportunity, and prosperity.
The Australian Government’s recently released Southeast Asia Economic Strategy to 2040 is central to this, as is our web of free trade agreements with regional partners.
Australia’s Special Envoy for Southeast Asia, Mr Nicholas Moore AO, visited Laos in July 2023 as well as every other ASEAN member state except Myanmar - to listen to what more Australia can be doing to capitalise on emerging opportunities, to grow trade and investment, and to take our economic engagement to the next level.
The strategy identifies three key sectors in Laos: agriculture and food, resources, and green energy transition.
As Laos seeks to diversify its economic and attract high quality foreign direct investment, Australia can work with Laos to achieve these aims.
* * *
Along with our economic investments, we are working to ensure our development program is effectively delivered and responsive to changing needs, pressures and priorities.
This means we have aligned our investments with the 9th National Socio-Economic Development Plan as well as the Government’s two national agendas on the economy and combatting the drug trade.
Our flagship programs support Laos’ basic education system and its human resource development.
We are also cooperating to strengthen Laos’ public financial management and support economic reform.
And we are working with Laos in the climate and energy sectors; including helping Laos develop open and sustainable carbon markets as all countries prepare to meet their Net Zero obligations by 2050.
For Australia, this area of our cooperation is essential.
With 22 of our 26 nearest neighbours are developing countries, we want to contribute to a region where all countries can thrive.
It’s why the Australian Government has increased our Official Development Assistance to an estimated A$1.24 billion in 2023-24 to Southeast Asia and East Asia.
Moving forward, our programs will be informed by Australia’s new International Development Policy, which outlines how we will focus our development assistance to shape an open, stable, and prosperous Indo-Pacific.
We have commenced consultations with relevant stakeholders and will release our next five year Development Partnerships Plan for Laos in the second half of 2024.
* * *
Before I turn to regional and strategic issues, I’d like to speak about trilateral cooperation between Australia, Laos, and Viet Nam.
In the past two years, our governments have committed to work trilaterally to promote sustainable development, economic resilience, and mutual understanding.
We’re doing this because we recognise the benefits of sharing expertise and working together to address shared challenges.
But more significantly, we are in a position pursue this modality because of the strength of our respective bilateral relationships.
Laos and Viet Nam have a clear special relationship bounded by its treaty alliance.
While Australia is currently negotiating a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with Viet Nam and a Comprehensive Partnership with Laos.
We are leveraging these strong foundations to find synergies to multiply the benefits and impacts of our cooperation – in areas from capacity building for officials – to policy exchanges around attracting high quality FDI.
We’re also exploring opportunities for trilateral cooperation between NAPPA, the Ho Chi Minh National Academy of Politics, and Australia.
Strategic challenges and opportunities: transparency, openness, and ASEAN
No foreign policy speech would be complete without touching on some of the challenges facing the world and the region – as well as the things we’re doing to address them.
The issues confronting us are stark.
Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine has brought war to Europe and rising fuel costs and food insecurity to the rest of the world.
The situation in the Middle East is on a knife’s edge as Israel’s war against Hamas continues.
North Korea risks destabilising the region with its ongoing nuclear weapons program and ballistic missile launches, threatening Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the broader region.
Closer to home, the Indo-Pacific is home to unprecedented military build-up, yet transparency and strategic reassurance are lacking.
Tension is rising between states with overlapping claims in the South China Sea, and disputed features have been militarised.
And there are rising instances of dangerous encounters in the air and at sea.
These combination of factors raise the risk of miscalculation that could set the world on a path of incalculable devastation.
Now, more than ever, we must redouble our efforts to create strategic certainty among the great powers so their strategic competition doesn’t spill over into conflict.
Openness and transparency are crucial.
We seek this with all our partners. With Laos. With ASEAN. And even with China.
Australia and China have had our differences after a period of difficulty.
But we’ve worked hard over the past year to stabilise the relationship.
Dialogue gives us the best chance to manage our differences wisely.
After all, there’s much at stake.
China is our largest trading partner.
It represents more than 25 per cent of our exports, and one in four Australian jobs relies upon this trade.
China relies on Australia for key industrial inputs that keep its electricity running and its industry growing.
And Chinese people enjoy many of Australia’s food and agricultural products: from seafood, to dairy, to wine.
We believe all countries in the region should behave responsibly, engage in good faith, and create the conditions for stability and certainty.
This is how Australia engages in the region.
It’s why we support ASEAN as the enduring, central institution of Southeast Asian nations.
And we wholeheartedly agree with ASEAN’s Outlook on the Indo Pacific when it says ASEAN member states want to see a region marked by peace, stability, security and prosperity.
ASEAN has focused on these ideals for more than 50 years, namely through:
(i) economic, social, cultural, technical and educational cooperation…
(ii) the promotion of regional peace and stability…
(iii) and respect for justice and the rule of law, including international law and the principles of the United Nations Charter.
ASEAN member states want to be able to make sovereign choices in pursuit of their collective and national interests.
Australia often talks about this in terms of every country’s individual agency to create the type of region it wants to live in…
…to use their diplomatic, economic and other engagement to maintain the region’s balance – and to uphold the norms and rules that have underpinned decades of peace and prosperity.
But just as we have a responsibility to help maintain the conditions of peace through our diplomacy, we also have a responsibility to play our part in collective deterrence of aggression.
The Australian Government is developing its military capabilities with our key allies and partners to ensure no state ever concludes that the benefits of conflict outweigh the risks.
We want to make it harder for states to coerce other states against their interests through force or the threatened use of force.
Our new capabilities under our AUKUS partnership will help in this respect.
And while we understand some partners worry about AUKUS, Australia is committed to transparency in our ambition to acquire nuclear-powered submarines, including through multiple briefings – including Laos, through Deputy Prime Minister Saleumxay.
Australia does not intend, nor will it ever, seek to acquire nuclear weapons.
We are talking about nuclear naval propulsion technology. Not nuclear weapons.
Australia remains steadfast in our commitment to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
It remains the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime.
We are working very closely with the IAEA to ensure maximum transparency and reassurance for the international community.
Looking ahead to 2024 and beyond
2024 is going to be a very important year for Laos.
It will be in the global spotlight as Chair of ASEAN.
The logistical challenge alone is staggering: more than 700 meetings, thousands of officials are expected to visit, and the most powerful heads of state will descend on Vientiane for the East Asia Summit in October.
We’ve worked hard to support Laos’ preparations for next year – providing over A$4 million of assistance.
For instance, we supported 34 officials to undertake deployments to Laos’ ASEAN Mission in Jakarta – to learn about the ASEAN agenda and process; to understand how Laos operates in ASEAN; and to understand how dialogue partners – like Australia – operate.
We also sent 17 officials to Australia to undertake a diploma in translation and interpretation.
And we supported the Ministry of Industry and Commerce to define Laos’ ‘priority economic deliverables’ for its Chair Year.
We are ready to respond to further requests for assistance, as required.
But it’s the policy issues that will require all of Laos’ diplomatic and political tradecraft.
The issues won’t be easy to navigate.
The situation in Myanmar shows little sign of resolution and continues to directly affect regional security and prosperity.
Moreover, the coup has reversed years of democratic, economic and development gains and plunged Myanmar into deep political and humanitarian crisis.
How Laos leads ASEAN through 2024 matters enormously: on Myanmar, the South China Sea, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and many other regional and global issues that find their way into any Chair Year.
We know it won’t be easy. And we know that Laos will be doing its best to balance these competing positions and achieve an outcome that’s satisfactory to all.
My friend and Former Minister to the Prime Minister, Alounkeo Kittikhoun, sometimes likes to describe Laos’ approach in ASEAN as “striving to make everyone happy” – and if that’s not possible, Laos will at least try to make sure everyone is “equally unhappy”.
These are different sides of the same coin.
But the thrust is the same: I have confidence Laos will approach next year with the same commitment to balance and fairness that characterised its previous Chair Years.
Conclusion
When I depart Laos next week, I’ll be satisfied the relationship is in good shape and in good hands.
I’ll be sorry to miss two major milestones in Australia’s relationship with Laos and ASEAN, namely the signing of our Comprehensive Partnership by PM Sonexay during his visit to Australia in March next year…
…as well as the ASEAN-Australia Commemorative Summit marking the 50th anniversary of Australia’s status as ASEAN’s first dialogue partner.
But I know this is not about my three years here, but over 70 years of unbroken relations.
I inherited a bilateral relationship that was already strong.
I did my best to contribute to leaving the relationship in even better shape.
I have every confidence that my successor – working with the amazing team at the Embassy and counterparts in government and the party – will maintain the momentum in the years to come.
Thank you for your attention. I’m really interested in the next session where we can open up discussion about some of the issues and ideas that I’ve raised.
I’d welcome questions, but would also be glad to hear your own ideas and reactions.
[ENDS]
